The μ-calculus is a powerful tool for specifying and verifying transition systems, including those with both demonic (universal) and angelic (existential) choice; its quantitative generalization qMμ extends to include probabilistic choice.
1. INTRODUCTION
Interpretations of the μ-Calculi
The standard, that is, nonquantitative, modal μ-calculus was introduced by Kozen [1983b] ; it extends Boolean dynamic program logic with least (μ) and greatest (ν) fixed-point operators. Its proof system is applicable to both finite and infinite state spaces; recent results [Walukiewicz 1995] have established a complete axiomatization; and it can be specialized to temporal logic. Thus, it has a simple denotational interpretation, and an associated proof theory.
But its operational significance is more elusive: General μ-calculus expressions can be difficult to use because, in all but the simplest cases, they are not easy on the intuition. Alternating fixed points can be especially intricate, and even the more straightforward (alternation-free) temporal subset has properties (particularly "branching-time properties") that are notoriously difficult to specify, as pointed out by Vardi [2001] .
Stirling's "two-player game" is an operational view that alleviates this problem by providing an alternative and complementary interpretation [Stirling 1995] .
The quantitative modal μ-calculus qMμ acts over probabilistic transition systems, extending the standard axioms from Boolean to real values; and would benefit just as much from having two complementary interpretations. Our first goal in this article is to construct these interpretations and prove their equivalence. One interpretation [Morgan and McIver 1997; Huth and Kwiatkowska 1997; de Alfaro and Majumdar 2004 ] generalizes Kozen's by lifting it from the Booleans into the reals; it is denotational. The other interpretation (defined here) generalizes Stirling's two-player games; it is operational.
The equivalence sets qMμ is on par with standard μ-calculus in that it, too, can benefit from a solid interface linking the logical and operational frameworks. In particular, the logical interpretation provides direct access to axioms, laws, and metatheorems, whereas the operational, game-based interpretation aids the intuition and continues in the more general context to provide a surprisingly practical specification tool-meeting, for example, Vardi's challenge to "figure out the meaning of AF AX p" as a branching-time formula.
Our second goal is to prove that memoryless strategies suffice for achieving the minimax value in the game interpretation. (That the minimax value exists has recently been proven by Martin [1998] for stochastic perfect-information parity games, to which ours are equivalent.) In fact, we use the second goal (actually, its denotational-rather than game version) to prove the first.
Both results rely on finiteness of the state space. The Kozen-style denotational interpretation of qMμ is based on our earlier extension [Kozen 1983a; Morgan et al. 1996] of Dijkstra/Hoare logic to probabilistic/demonic programs (corresponding to the ∀ modality): We regard its formulas as a real-valued logic based on "greatest pre-expectations" of random variables, rather than weakest preconditions of predicates. It can express the specific "probability of achieving a postcondition," since the probability of an event is the expected value of its characteristic function, 1 but it applies more generally to other cost-based properties, besides.
Converting predicates "wholesale" from Boolean-to real-valued state functions contrasts with probabilistic logics that use "threshold functions" [Bianco and de Alfaro 1995; Narasimha et al. 1999 ] to mix Boolean and numeric arguments: The uniformity in our case means that standard Boolean identities in branching-time temporal logic [Ben-Ari et al. 1983 ] suggest corresponding quantitative laws for us [Morgan and McIver 1999a] , and so we get a powerful collection of algebraic properties "for free." The "implies" relation between Booleans is replaced by the standard "≤" order on the reals; false and true become 0 and 1; and fixed points are then associated with monotonic real-, rather than Boolean-valued, functions. The resulting arithmetic logic is applicable to a restricted class of real-valued functions, and we recall its definition in Section 3.
The Stirling-style interpretation is operational, and we derive it from his earlier strategy-based game metaphor for the standard μ-calculus. In our richer context, however, we must distinguish nondeterministic choice-both demonic and angelic-from probabilistic choice: The former continues to be represented by the two players' strategies; but the latter is represented by the new feature that the players gamble. In Section 4 we set out the details.
In Section 5, we give a worked example of the full use of quantitative aspects of the calculus, beyond simply calculating probabilities.
Our main mathematical result appears in Section 6. Stirling showed that for standard formulae, the Boolean value of the Kozen interpretation corresponds to the existence of a winning strategy in his game interpretation; in the quantitative version of this, however, strategies in the game must become "optimal," rather than "winning." We show that for quantitative formulae, the Kozen interpretation, now a real number, corresponds to the expected winnings from the zero-sum gambling game of the Stirling interpretation.
A key step in our proof is inspired by the work of Everett [1957] . We show that the / in a formula can be replaced by Boolean state predicates, without affecting its denotational value: These choice functions become the memoryless strategies. Together with our main result, this establishes the existence of memoryless strategies for the game interpretation as well.
Thus overall, we set the quantitative μ-calculus qMμ on par with standard μ-calculus in that a suitable form of "logical validity" corresponds exactly to an operational interpretation, providing a bridge between algorithmic and proof-based techniques. As with standard μ-calculus, a specifier can use the operational semantics to build his intuitions into a game, and can then use general features of the logic-whose soundness has been proven relative to the denotational semantics-to prove properties about the specific application. For example, the sublinearity [Morgan et al. 1996] of qMμ (the quantitative generalization of the conjunctivity of standard modal algebras) has been used in its quantitative temporal subset qTL to prove a number of algebraic laws corresponding to those for standard branching-time temporal logic [Morgan and McIver 1999a] .
Preliminary experiments have shown that the proof system is very effective for unraveling the intricacies of distributed protocols [Rabin 1982; Morgan and McIver 1999b] . Moreover, it provides an attractive proof framework for Markov decision processes [Filar and Vrieze 1996; Morgan and McIver 2001] -and indeed, many of the problems there have a succinct specification as μ-calculus formulae, as the example of Section 5 illustrates. In reachability-style problems [de Alfaro 1999] , proof-theoretic methods based on the logic presented here have produced very direct arguments related to the abstraction of probabilities [Morgan and McIver 2003] , and even more telling is that the logic is applicable even in infinite state spaces [de Alfaro 1999] . All of this suggests that further exploration of qMμ will continue to be fruitful.
Perfect-Information Quantitative Stochastic Parity Games
An alternative to our stochastic extension of Stirling games is perfectinformation stochastic parity games [Filar and Vrieze 1996] ; in the nonstochastic case, a nice summary is given by Niwinski [2002] of their connection to the (standard) μ-calculus. Like Stirling games, parity games formalize a contest between a maximizing and a minimizing player, each of whom directs the play in a turnwise fashion. Stochastic parity games, however, are usually formalized via stochastic game graphs in which nodes are annotated by exactly one of the two players or by chance, the latter representing a probabilistic choice between (usually) two options. In addition, the states are labeled with priorities (integer values) which are used to determine the winning conditions in the event of an infinite play.
Stirling games are equivalent to perfect-information stochastic parity games, so that the results described here are also valid in the stochastic-parity-game framework.
Martin [1998] showed that stochastic parity games are well-defined in the sense that they have a "value" which is (roughly speaking) the greatest expected payoff the maximizing player can guarantee against all strategies of the minimizing player. Our second result (Theorem 6.11) is that the players have memoryless strategies for achieving this optimal payoff.
We chose the Stirling formulation because it led to a domain-theoretical construction for our proofs, which simplified our principal goal-the equivalence of the two interpretations. We ended up with memoryless strategies for both, as well.
We assume generally that S is some countable state space (though for the principal result we restrict to finiteness, in Section 6). If f is a function, then by f .x, we mean f applied to x, and f .x. y is ( f .x). y where appropriate; functional composition is written with •, so that (
. We denote the set of discrete probability subdistributions over a set X by X : This is the set of functions from X into the real interval [0, 1] that sum to no more than one; and if A is a random variable with respect to some probability space, and δ is some probability subdistribution, we write δ A for the expected value of A with respect to δ.
2 In the special case that δ is in X and A is a bounded real-valued function on X , in fact, δ A is equal to x:X A.x × δ.x.
PROBABILISTIC TRANSITION SYSTEMS AND QMμ
In this section we set out our logical language, together with some details about the probabilistic systems over which its formulae are to be interpreted. The basic carrier set is the state space S.
Formulae φ in qMμ (in positive 3 form) are constructed as follows:
-Variables X are of type S → [0, 1], and are used for binding fixed points.
-Terms A stand for fixed functions in S → [0, 1].
-Terms K represent finite nonempty sets of probabilistic state-to-state transitions in R.S (see the following), with · and [·] forming, respectively, angelic (existential) and demonic (universal) modalities from them. -Terms G describe Boolean functions of S, used in the ("if ") G ("else") style [Hoare 1985 ].
It is well-known that such formulae can be used to express complex properties of computations. In this article, we interpret the formulae over trees generated from the generalized probabilistic transitions of R.S, the functions t in S → S $ where S $ is just the state space S with a special "payoff " state $ adjoined. Thus S $ is the set of subdistributions over this, and the elements t of R.S give the probability of passage from initial s to final (proper) This formulation of the payoff has three desirable properties. The first is that the probabilistically expected halt-and-payoff is just t.s.$ itself. The second property is that we can consider the probabilities of outcomes from s to sum to 2 Normal mathematical practice is to write A dδ, but this greatly confuses the roles of bound and free variables: The distribution (measure) variable δ in dδ is free in the expression, but in the analogous f (x) dx of Analysis, the independent variable x in dx is bound. 3 The restriction to the positive fragment is for the usual reason: that the interpretation of any expression (λX · φ), constructed according to the given rules, should yield a monotone function of X . 4 If s :S t.s.s is one, then t.s.$ must be zero because elements of S $ sum to no more than one. In this case, we define both the actual and expected payoffs to be zero. one exactly (rather than to no more than one), since any deficit is "soaked up" in the probability of transit to payoff; this simplifies our operational interpretation. Note that the payoff is always in the interval [0, 1] .
The third property is that transitions preserve one-boundedness in the following sense. Define the set of expectations E S (over S) to be the set of onebounded functions S → [0, 1]. If A in E S gives a "postexpectation" A.s expected to be realized at state s after transition t, then the "pre-expectation" at s before transition t is
t.s.$ + t.s
A , where the subdistribution t.s under is restricted to states in S proper.
It is the expected value realized by making transition t from s to s , or possibly $, taking A.s in the former case and (1) in the latter. That this pre-expectation is also one-bounded, that is, is in E S, allows us to confine our work to the real interval [0, 1] throughout. Hence purely probabilistic computation trees can be constructed by "pasting together" applications of transitions t 0 , t 1 , . . . drawn from R.S, with branches to $ being tips. The probabilities attached to the individual steps then generate a distribution over computational paths which is defined by the sigma-algebra of extensions of finite sequences, a well-known construction [Grimmett and Welsh 1986] .
In our interpretations, we will use valuations in the usual way. Given a formula φ, a valuation V does four things: (i) It maps each A in φ to a fixed expectation in E S; (ii) it maps each K to a fixed, nonempty finite set of probabilistic transitions in R.S; (iii) it maps each G to a predicate over S; and (iv) it tracks the current instances of "unfoldings" of fixed points by including mappings for bound variables X (for notational economy, in (iv) we are allowing V to take over the role usually given to a separate "environment" parameter).
We make one simplification to our language, without compromising expressivity. Because the valuation V assigns finite sets to all occurrences of K, we can replace each modality K φ (respectively, [K]φ) by an explicit maxjunct k:K {k}φ (respectively, minjunct k:K {k}φ) of (symbols k denoting) transitions k in the set denoted by K. We shall therefore continue with a reduced language given by
We replace (ii) in respect to V by: (ii') it maps each occurrence of {k} to a (single) probabilistic transition in R.S.
DENOTATIONAL INTERPRETATION
In this section we recall how the quantitative logic for nondeterministic and probabilistic sequential programs [Kozen 1983a; Morgan et al. 1996] (from which we inherit the use of expectations, and the semantic definition ||{k}φ|| in the following) leads to a quantitative generalization of Kozen's denotational interpretation of μ-calculus that is suitable for probabilistic transition systems.
Let φ be a qMμ formula and V a valuation as before. We write ||φ|| V for its meaning, an expectation in E S determined by the rules given in Figure 2 . Part of the contribution of our previous work McIver 1997, 1999a ] is summarized in the following lemma.
LEMMA 3.1. The quantitative logic qMμ is well-defined: For any φ in the language, and valuation V, the interpretation ||φ|| V is an expectation in E S.
PROOF. We use structural induction, arithmetic, that our formulae express only monotone functions, and that (E S, ≤) is a complete partial order.
OPERATIONAL INTERPRETATION
In this section we give the alternative, operational account of qMμ formulae φ (of the reduced language): Rather than the denotational style of Section 3, we use a generalization of Stirling's turn-based game [Stirling 1995] .
The Stirling game is between two players Max and Min. As in Section 3, we assume a probabilistic transition system R.S and a valuation V. Play progresses through a sequence of game positions, each of which is either a pair (φ, s) where φ is a formula and s is a state in S, or a single ( y) for some real-valued payoff y in [0, 1] . Following Stirling, we will use the idea of "colors" to handle repeated returns to a fixed point. A game path is of the form (φ 0 , s 0 ), (φ 1 , s 1 ), · · ·, thus being a sequence of game positions, with (if finite) a payoff position ( y) at the end. The initial formula φ 0 is the given φ, and s 0 is an initial state in S. A move from position (φ i , s i ) to (φ i+1 , s i+1 ) or to ( y) is specified by the rules of Figure 3 .
A game path is said to be valid if it can occur as a sequence according to the aforementioned rules. We note that along any game path, at most, one color can appear infinitely often: LEMMA 4.1. A valid game path is either finite, terminating at some payoff ( y), or infinite; if infinite, then exactly one color appears infinitely often in it. Stirling [1995] .) Assume for a contradiction that colors C 1 and C 2 occur infinitely often in some valid game path p, with C 1 occurring first; let 1 and 2 , respectively, be the formulae bound to them. Since C 1 occurs first, formula 1 cannot contain C 2 .
PROOF. (See also
By assumption, there must be an infinite tail C 2 , . . . , C 1 , 1 , . . . of path p. Since 1 contains no C 2 itself, the only occurrences of C 2 following 1 in p must be freshly generated, but they cannot be freshly generated if C 2 already appears in the path.
To complete the description of the game, we would normally give the winning/losing conditions. Here, however, we are operating over real, rather than Boolean, values, and we speak instead of the "value" of the game. In the choices φ φ (respectively, φ φ ), player Max (respectively, Min) follows a strategy in which he tries to force play down a path that maximizes (minimizes) a real-valued "payoff," defined as follows. (1) The path π is finite, terminating in a game state ( y); in this case, the value
Val.π is y. (2) The path π is infinite and there is a color C appearing infinitely often in π that was generated by a greatest fixed-point ν; in this case, Val.π is 1. (3) The path π is infinite and there is a color C appearing infinitely often in π that was generated by a least fixed-point μ; in this case, Val.π is 0.
Conditions (2) and (3) are essentially the winning conditions in perfectinformation stochastic parity games [Filar and Vrieze 1996] , where the "priorities" assigned to the states in a parity-game graph correspond roughly to the nesting depth of the quantifier, and the parities indicate whether the quantifiers are least or greatest fixed-points. This is a zero-sum game.
In the next section we introduce "player strategies" informally, and we show by example how they determine the value of the game.
WORKED EXAMPLE: INVESTING IN THE FUTURES MARKET

Describing a Game
Typical properties of probabilistic systems are often cost-based: Our example involves money. Since it concerns general expected values, it lies strictly outside the scope of "plain" probabilistic temporal logic.
An investor I has been given the right to make an investment in "futures," a fixed number of shares in a specific company that he can reserve on the first day of any month he chooses. Exactly one month later, the shares will be delivered and will collectively have a market value on that day.
His problem is to decide when to make his reservation so that the market value one month later is maximized.
The details are as follows:
(1) The market value v of the shares is a whole number of dollars between $0 and $10 inclusive; it has a probability p of going up by $1 in any month, and 1− p of going down by $1, except that it must remain within these bounds. The probability p represents short-term market uncertainty. (2) Probability p itself varies month-by-month in steps of 0.1 between zero and one: When v is less than $5, the probability that p will rise is 2/3; when v is more than $5, the probability of p's falling is 2/3; and when v is $5 exactly, the probability is 1/2 that p will go either way. The movement of p represents investors' knowledge of long-term "cyclic second-order" trends.
•
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(3) There is a cap c on the value of v, initially $10, which has probability 1/2 of falling by $1 in any month; otherwise, it remains where it is. The "falling cap" models the fact that the company is in a slow decline. (4) If in a given month the investor does not reserve, then at the very next month he might find he is temporarily barred from doing so. But he cannot be barred for two months consecutively. (5) If he never reserves, then he receives zero.
If it were not for Item 3, the investor's strategy would be the obvious one: "Wait until v ≥ 9 and p = 1 (however long this takes) and make a reservation then." But the falling cap defeats that, effectively discounting the payoff as time passes, and we will need to consider more sophisticated strategies which take this into account.
The situation is summed up by the transition system set out in Figure 4 :
-During each month, there are three purely probabilistic actions that occur, and their compounded effects determine a transition m. -At the beginning of each month, the investor makes a maximizing (angelic) choice of whether to reserve, but if he does not; then -at the beginning of the next month, there is a minimizing (demonic) choice of whether he is barred.
We can easily use the intuition provided by our game interpretation in Section 4 to write a formula describing the aforementioned system. The state space is (v, p, c) , and we define a transition
to capture the effect of the large arrows in Figure 4 .
We can then use our logical language to describe the surrounding angelic and demonic choices, including the "loop back" (fixed point), which gives value zero (i.e., as for μ) if it never terminates. Using month to denote m, and a constant expectation Sold 5 to denote the function v returning just the v component of the state, we would write our formula as
Playing the Game
For the game interpretation, we reveal the a probabilistic tree for the transition system in Figure 4 by duplicating nodes with multiple incoming arcs (as in month), "unfolding" back-loops, and making minimizing or maximizing choices as they are encountered. In this example, at each unfolding, both the investor I (making choices whether to reserve) and the stock market M (making choices whether to impose a bar) need to choose between two ongoing branches, and their choices could be different each time they revisit their respective decision points. Each of I, M will be using a strategy.
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For example, the investor I 's strategy for dealing with the falling cap might be wait until the share value v (rising) meets the cap c (falling), and reserve then.
Waiting for v to rise is a good idea, and when it has met the cap c there is clearly no point in waiting further. M 's strategy, opposing I , might be bar the investor, if possible, whenever the shares' probability p of rising exceeds 1/2.
In general, let σ I and σ M be sequences (possibly infinite) of choices, like the aforementioned, that I and M might make. When these sequences are followed, the game tree they generate determines a probability distribution over valid game paths [Grimmett and Welsh 1986] . Anticipating the next section, we let
denote the path distribution generated by σ I and σ M . We can now describe I 's actual payoff as a function of σ I and σ M , an expected value
with the understanding that the random variable in the integral's body yields zero for an infinite path because we are using a least fixed-point in this example. In some cases, the choices made by I and M can be memoryless in the sense that in identical situations (identical values of v, p, c in this case, and the same position in the transition system), they will always make the same choice. Both preceding Eqs. (3) and (4) are memoryless.
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Memoryless strategies are particularly important for the efficient computation of expected payoffs [Filar and Vrieze 1996] , and in Section 6 we show that they suffice for analysis of qMμ formulae when the state space is finite-thus neither player gains an advantage by remembering where he has been.
The Value of the Game
As is usual in game theory, when the actual strategies of the two players are unknown, we define the value of the game to be the the minimax over all strategy sequences of the expected payoff. It is well-defined only when it is the same as the maximin, that is, when in the notation of the previous Eq. (5) we have
As noted in Section 1.2, our Stirling games are perfect-information stochastic parity games, and Martin [1998] has shown that they do have a well-defined value. Our result in Section 6 will show that this value is the same as the denotational interpretation, so that we can use the game interpretation to determine what formula to write, and then use the denotational interpretation, and all the algebra that comes with it, to reason about the formula's value.
Sometimes we can even use the denotational interpretation to calculate an approximation to this value; an example of this is given in Section 7.
In the next section, we show that the techniques illustrated earlier are valid for all games, not just for this example, that is, that for finite state spaces, the value of any game of the form given in Section 4 (generated by some qMμ formula φ) corresponds exactly to the denotational interpretation of φ as in Section 3; in doing so, we prove that the value can be realized by memoryless strategies.
We will return to the stock-market example in Section 7, where we discuss the relationship between our theoretical results and practical computational schemes.
PROOF OF EQUIVALENCE
In this section we give our main result, the equivalence of the operational "Stirling game" and the logical "Kozen-denotation" interpretations of qMμ formulae. We formalize strategies in both cases, whether they can or cannot have memory of where the game or transition system has gone so far, and the effect of minimaxing over them. A corollary will be that strategies gain no power from memory in these games.
Fixed Strategies for Stirling Games
We first explain how the games of Figure 3 can be formalized, provided that a fixed pair of players' strategies is decided beforehand.
The current position of a game (as we saw in Section 4) is a formula/state pair. We introduce two strategy functions σ and σ which are used to prescribe in advance the players' decisions to be made as they go along.
Definition 6.1 (Strategies in Stirling Games). We define strategy functions σ and σ of type "finite-game-path to Boolean" which are used by the players as follows. The player Min (respectively, Max), instead of deciding on-the-fly how to interpret a decision point (respectively, ), takes the strategy function σ (respectively, σ ) and applies this to the sequence of game positions traversed so far. The result "true" means "take the left subformula."
A strategy sequence σ (for the minimizing player) is memoryless if it depends only on the current game position, and not on earlier positions: In other words, σ is memoryless if σ . p = σ . p whenever p and p agree on their final element. A similar definition applies to σ . These strategies model full memory because each is given as an argument the complete history of the game up to its point of use.
We can now formalize our probabilistic extension of Stirling's game. Rather than see it as in our earlier Figure 3 , a linear sequence of moves interleaving maximizing, minimizing, and probabilistic choices, we use our strategy functions to present the game in two separated stages.
In the first stage, we construct a (possibly infinite) purely probabilistic game tree using the given formula φ, the initial state s, and the strategy functions σ , σ : Effectively, we produce a Markov chain. The process is shown in Figure 5 , and clearly is derived from the game of Figure 3 given earlier: The difference is that in Figure 5 , the probabilistic choices are "deferred" by our showing the PROOF. We remarked in Section 2 that purely probabilistic computation trees [[φ]] σ ,σ V .s, generated as in Figure 5 , determine a sigma-algebra [Grimmett and Welsh 1986] ; we need only show that function Val is measurable over them. But this follows from the comment after Definition 4.2 concerning the correspondence to winning conditions in stochastic parity games, and the well-known fact that omega-regular (and hence, parity) sets are Borel [Thomas 1995] .
For the second stage, we play the purely probabilistic game determined by the tree just generated; the expected value of function Val over this tree gives the result of so doing. Thus, we have the following definition, taking the two stages together.
Definition 6.3 (Value of Fixed-Strategy Stirling Game) . The value of a game played from formula φ and initial state s, with fixed strategies σ , σ , is given by the expected value
Val of Val over the (probability distribution determined by the) purely probabilistic game tree [[φ]] σ ,σ V .s generated by the formula, the strategies, and the initial state, as shown in Figure 5 .
Minimaxed Strategies for Stirling Games
By putting the two stages of Section 6.1 together, and taking the minimax with respect to strategies, we can define the value of a Stirling game in general.
Definition 6.4 (The Value of a Full Stirling Game). Given a formula φ and a valuation V, the value of the associated Stirling game is given by
where the quantification is taken over all strategy functions σ and σ .
LEMMA 6.5 (WELL DEFINEDNESS OF DEFINITION 6.4). The value of a Stirling game is well-defined, that is, the minimax is indeed equal to the maximin.
PROOF. This follows immediately from the observation that Stirling games are perfect-information stochastic parity games, so that we can apply the results of Martin [1998] .
However, this equality is also a corollary of our first main result, Theorem 6.10 to come.
The full game is played "all at once" in Figure 3 , yet the strategy functions and construction of Figure 5 make it appear as if it is played in two stages: The point of this is that in the second, purely probabilistic, stage, the absence of max/minnondeterminism allows us to use standard techniques of expected values. It is the strategy functions' generality that makes the two views equivalent.
Fixed Strategies for Kozen Denotations
Having defined fixed-strategy games, our second step is to define fixed-strategy denotations: We augment the semantics of Section 3 with the same strategy functions as in Section 6.1. For clarity, we use slightly different brackets |||φ||| σ ,σ V for the strategy-extended semantics.
The necessary alterations to the rules in Figure 2 are straightforward, the principal one being that in Case 4, instead of taking a minimum or maximum, we use the argument σ or σ , as appropriate, to determine whether to carry on with or with . A technical complication is, however, that all the definitions have to be changed so that the "game sequence so far" is available to σ and σ when required. This is arranged by introducing an extra "path so far" argument and passing it, suitably extended, on every righthand side.
The modified rules are given in full in Figure 6 .
Equivalence of Fixed-Strategy Interpretations
We now have our first equivalence, but for fixed strategies only:
LEMMA 6.6 (EQUIVALENCE OF FIXED-STRATEGY GAMES AND DENOTATIONS). For all closed qMμ formulae φ, valuations V, states s, and strategies σ , σ , we have
where Val is given by Definition 4.2, the tree-building semantic function [[·] ] is as given in Figure 5 , and the strategy-extended denotational semantics ||| · ||| is as given in Figure 6 .
PROOF. We use structural induction over a stronger hypothesis including explicit paths (in Eq. 7 to follow), straightforward except when least or greatest fixed-points generate infinite trees; in each inductive case, the current formula will be φ, and its constituent formula(e) will be (with primes if there are several). During the proof, we formalize the use of strategies in both interpretations, extending both semantic functions with a "path" argument of type , say, which records the steps as the formula is decomposed; the path is used in the ( ) case as the argument to the strategy σ (σ ).
The tree construction within the inductive argument introduces two new features: (a) that the current tree may in fact be a subtree, depending from some path π: in the overall tree corresponding to the original formula; and (b) that even though the whole tree is built from a closed formula, we must consider free variables in the inductive argument because it descends into the body of fixed points.
The first feature (a) affects the use of strategy functions: When resolving a -choice, say, the path passed to the history-dependent minimizing strategy σ must be the path from the overall root, that is, the current path within the subtree appended to the path π which led to the subtree. Thus we supply a path as an extra argument to the tree-generating function, that is, we write
V .π.s, following the convention that π does not include the current position (φ, s).
If π is omitted (as in statement (6) of the lemma), then it is taken to be the empty path .
For the second feature (b), we assume that all free variables X in the current formula are defined in the valuation V, taken to functions of type → S → [0, 1]; note that these functions ultimately deliver real values for both interpretations, not subtrees. If we encounter X when building the tree from current path π and state s, we look up the value X in V to get a function f , and then insert the leaf node ( f .π + .s) directly into the tree at that point, where π + is path π routinely extended (as in Figure 6 for the Kozen semantics) with the current game position; in this case, (X , s). The intention is that the stored function f "short-circuits" the continued play from (X , s) after path π + : It simply supplies the value directly.
Note that in contrast, the colors C are used to look up some formula [X →C] from which the tree building then continues.
The extended Kozen semantics |||φ||| σ ,σ V .π.s also accepts strategy sequences σ , σ and a path argument π , and in the definitions, the path argument is routinely extended step-by-step so that it simulates the path that would be encountered in the corresponding tree; see Figure 6 . Again, an omitted path defaults to empty.
The inductive argument thus treats the stronger hypothesis, which includes the aforementioned features; it says that for all qMμ formulae φ, valuations V, paths π , states s, and strategies σ , σ , we have
provided that all free variables in the formula φ are mapped by V to functions of type → S → [0, 1] and that all colors in φ are suitably bound. Our original goal (6) is the case of (7) in which V defines only language constants and π is empty. We now give a representative selection of cases in the inductive argument.
Base Case φ is X . From Figure 5 , we have that the game subtree
V .π.s is just the tip (V.X .π.s), which value we note from the typing of V given just before (7) is a real in [0, 1]; from Definition 4.2 of Val, we then have that the lefthand side of (7) has that value V.X .π.s.
From Case 1 of Figure 6 , we have that the righthand side is We now have Inductive Case φ is . The game tree again has (φ, s) at its root, but is extended with a single probability-one branch leading either to [[ ]] σ ,σ
σ ,σ
V .π + .s, depending on whether σ .π + is true (take ) or false (take ). Note that the state is not changed, and that the strategy function is applied to π + (not π ), so that it has access to the current formula and state. The inductive hypothesis then applies.
Inductive case φ is (μX · ). Here, in Figure 6 (6), we appeal to -continuity 7 to write the righthand side as a limit
and 0.π .s = 0 for all π and s , after which we show by mathematical induction that for all n in N, all states s , and all extensions π of π + , we have
for suitably defined approximants Val C n of Val, where C is the color chosen at position (φ, s) during the tree building when the fixed-point formula was encountered.
Our overall conclusion will follow by taking limits on both sides, appealing to bounded monotone convergence [Grimmett and Welsh 1986] to distribute through on the right.
Define Val C n .π for any path π to be just Val.π , provided that π contains fewer than n occurrences of color C; if, however, π contains at least n occurrences of C, define Val C n .π to be zero instead. We have ( n · Val C n ) = Val because for all π with only finitely many C, we have Val C n .π = Val.π for large enough n; and for those π with infinitely many C, we have zero in both cases.
The proof of Eq. (8) itself is by mathematical induction over n, for which we give the details in Appendix A (the appeal to the main structural-induction hypothesis is made there). 
from Eq. 8 in the special case π = π
Val , tree-building step for μ (backwards); C looks up [X →C] where the final step is the one in which color C was generated. Inductive Case φ is (ν X · ). This case is essentially the same as the μ-case: We define the truncated valuations Val C n .π as before, except that paths π with at least n occurrences of C are taken to one (rather than to zero).
A small complication, however, occurs in the use of bounded monotone convergence, which requires the sequence of valuations to be monotone nondecreasing. Since all the terms lie in [0, 1], we can deal with this by subtracting from one throughout, both before and after.
Minimaxed Strategies for Kozen Denotations
We have from Section 6.2 that the minimax is defined for Stirling games, and from Section 6.4 immediately that the fixed-strategy Stirling games and fixedstrategy Kozen denotations agree. We thus have the well-definedness of minimaxed Kozen denotations directly: COROLLARY 6.7. The minimax is equal to the maximin of the Kozen interpretation:
However, our overall aim-and the principal result of this article-is to eliminate explicit mention of strategies altogether so as to show that whether minimaxed or maximined, whether Stirling-or Kozen-interpreted, the value of the formula is just ||φ|| V .s , that is, the simple denotational value with the and interpreted directly. For this, we must first show that memoryless strategies suffice.
Memoryless Strategies Suffice
In this section we show that provided S is finite, for any formula φ (possibly including and operators), there are specific state predicates (collected into tuples G and G) that can replace these operators, without affecting the value of the formula. We carry out the proof entirely within the denotational interpretation. Our approach is inspired by techniques of Everett, who treated formulae with a single least fixed-point [Everett 1957 ]; we have constructed a generalized argument to deal with multiple fixed points nested arbitrarily.
Let formula φ G be derived from φ by the syntactic operation of replacing each operator in φ by a specific predicate symbol drawn from a tuple G of our choice, possibly a different symbol for each syntactic occurrence of . This represents replacing the general minimizing choice by some specific memoryless strategy(ies) G that G denotes.
Similarly, we write φ G for the derived formula in which all instances of are replaced left-to-right by successive predicate symbols in a tuple G. In formula φ G,G we have replaced both and .
Our main lemma (Lemma 6.8, given next) concerning memoryless strategies is that in the denotational approach, the / can be removed from the formulae, and replaced by such explicit Boolean choices. For example, if the formula φ is
then we are saying we can find predicate tuples (G 1 ) and (G 1 , G 2 ) such that for corresponding predicate-symbol tuples G= (G 1 ) and G= (G 1 , G 2 ), we can define
and then extend V to a V that takes G 1 , G 1 , G 2 to G 1 , G 1 , G 2 , respectively, so that φ G , φ G , and φ itself are all || · || V -equivalent.
The inductive proof will be straightforward, except for replacement of within μ (and, dually, replacement of within ν); for this case, we need a technical lemma (Lemma B.11) that has been placed in Appendix B.
LEMMA 6.8 (MEMORYLESS STRATEGIES SUFFICE). For any formula φ, possibly containing strategy operators / and valuation V, there are state-predicate tuples G/ G (possibly depending on V) such that
||φ G || V = ||φ|| V = ||φ G || V ,(9)
where V is the technical extension of V that maps new symbols G/ G to the tuples G/ G, respectively, and leaves all else unchanged.
PROOF. We use induction over the size of φ, treating the left and right equalities (9) simultaneously. Here, we include only the details involving explicit / and fixed points, since the other cases follow immediately by appealing to the inductive hypothesis; the base cases involve formulae that contain no / choices.
Inductive Case 1 2 . To eliminate (i.e., replace all 's in 1 2 by elements of some G) we appeal to induction immediately, giving, say, G 1 and G 2 , which we concatenate.
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To eliminate , we note that
where G is defined to be true exactly at states where || 1 || V > || 2 || V , and false otherwise, and the new symbol G is bound to it in V . Now, since 1 and 2 have strictly smaller size than the original φ, we can appeal to the inductive hypothesis to eliminate the remaining choices in 1 and 2 independently.
Inductive Case 1 2 . Proceed by analogy with 1 2 . Now because the argument for fixed points is mainly over properties of realvalued functions, we shift to a more mathematical style of presentation. Variables f , g , . . . denote (Curried) functions of type expectation(s)-to-expectation, and w, x, . . . are expectations. For function f of one argument, we write μ. f for its least fixed-point.
Inductive Case (μX · ). Let f be the function denoted by the interior formula with respect to a single expectation-valued argument x supplied for the variable X , with the values of any other free variables in fixed by the environment V; for any G, G, let functions f G , f G , and f G,G be derived similarly from G , G , and G,G via a suitable V .
We now show that we can eliminate and that we can eliminate .
Eliminate . We must show μ. f = μ. f G for some G. First, note that trivially μ. f ≤ μ. f G , since f ≤ f G . Then, since is smaller in size than φ, our inductive hypothesis provides for any x a G x so that f G x .x = f .x; take x = μ. f and therefore choose G (i.e.,
Eliminate . In this case we must show μ. f = μ. f G for some G; this time, the trivial inequality is that μ. f G ≤ μ. f for any G.
For the other direction, we use Lemma B.11 of Appendix B to note that for any ε > 0, there is a G ε such that μ. f G ε ≥ μ. f − ε -whence the existence of a single G satisfying μ. f G ≥ μ. f follows from the finiteness of the state space: the set of possible strategy tuples over S is finite (for this fixed formula ) as well, and so there must be one that works here for all ε.
Inductive Case (ν X · ). This result is dual to (μX · ) via the equality of
All Five Interpretations are Equal
With Lemma 6.8, we finish off by showing that all five interpretations are equal: the minimax Stirling game, maximin Stirling game, minimax Kozen denotation, maximin Kozen denotation, and finally, the simple Kozen denotation with the / operators still in place. For this, we use our memoryless strategies as follows.
LEMMA 6.9. For all qMμ formulae φ, valuations V, and strategies σ , σ , we have
PROOF. Note first that from Lemma 6.8, we have predicates G and G satisfying
where V extends V as before with suitable definitions of G and G.
To begin with, using the predicates G from Eq. (11), we start from the lefthand-side of (10) and observe that
in which, on the right, we omit the now-ignored σ argument. The first equality is valid, since the original formula φ does not refer to the extra symbols in V ; the inequality then follows, since the σ could have selected exactly those predicates G referred to in V by G, simply by making an appropriate choice of σ . We then eliminate the explicit strategies altogether by observing that
because the simpler || · ||-style semantics on the right interprets as maximum, which cannot be less than the result of appealing to some strategy function σ .
We can now continue on our way towards the righthand side of (10) as follows:
as for previous Eq. (13), backwards, and with inequality reversed
as for previous Eq. (12), backwards, and with inequality reversed and we are done.
Since the outer two terms in Eq. (10) are equal, from Corollary 6.7, we now have equality of all three terms. Independently of Corollary 6.7, we could remark that trivially, we have
so establishing the three-way equality without appealing to games at all. Either way, we now have our main theorem. 
THEOREM 6.10 (CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN GAMES AND DENOTATIONS). The value of the Stirling game over φ is the denotation ||φ|| V . In fact, all five
PROOF. Lemma 6.6 establishes both Eqs. (15) = (17) and (16) = (18); Lemma 6.9 establishes (17) ≤ (19) ≤ (18); and Remark (14) gives us (18) ≤ (17).
The equality (15) = (16) is what was established previously by Martin [1998] in the context of perfect-information stochastic parity games.
Finally, we can state an even tighter result about the players' strategies.
THEOREM 6.11 (MEMORYLESS STRATEGIES). For any Stirling game, there exists a memoryless strategy G which, if followed by player Max, achieves the optimal value against all strategies of player Min. A similar result holds for player Min against all strategies of Max.
PROOF. Directly from Lemma 6.8 and Theorem 6.10.
Note that the inequality (13) holds also when more generally, the strategies σ are mixed: Even if they chose probabilistically between the alternatives, they still could not do better than . Thus, a player's optimal strategy is robust against all strategies of the other player, even mixed; and the optimal strategy is pure.
SCHEMES FOR NUMERICAL COMPUTATION
In this section we return to the stock-market example of Section 5, and we now illustrate briefly how our theoretical results can be used to justify various methods for computing the value of the game. Recall that the formula for expressing the optimal payoff was given by Game= (μX · {month}Sold {month}(X {month}X )).
(2) Although the details of month are (deliberately) slightly messy, the structure of the overall formula Game was chosen (also deliberately) to be fairly simple, and as such (according to Theorem 6.10 and continuity) the value of the game can be approximated by iterating the function
beginning from the constant "bottom" function that is zero everywhere on the state space. As earlier, function v projects the state onto its v-component. Effectively, this procedure computes the least fixed point of the Kozen semantics, which by Theorem 6.10 is the same as the value of the game.
Carrying out this calculation 10 shows, for example, that if p is initially 0.5 and the cap c is 10, then the optimal expected sale value for the investor is initial share value: 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 optimal expected sale: 4.16 4.30 4.55 4.88 5.24 5.52 6.00 7.00 8.00 9.00 9.50 (20) Even when the share value is only "moderately high," we thus see there is nothing to be gained by waiting, since the cap is likely to drop. For low initial values, however, some benefit can be gained by delaying the reservation for a while. By comparison, calculations show that the investor's "seat-of-the-pants" strategy in Eq. (3) From this, we might guess that when v is at least $6 (and p and c are as given), it is better to "reserve now" (as Eq. (20) suggests) than to follow (3) and wait.
Winning the Game
Ideally, we would like to be able to calculate both the value of the game and the strategies to realize this, for example, in this case we would like to be able to offer "investment advice." Even better than knowing that (3) can be improved, as we have just seen it can, is knowing how to improve it.
In some cases, the denotational interpretation can help by providing theorems that allow formulae to be simplified [Morgan and McIver 1999a] or abstracted, thus bringing an apparently difficult formula within the range of probabilistic model-checkers [PRISM 2006] .
For formulae with a particularly simple structure, we might even be able to appeal to theorems (proved using algebraic identities of qMμ, themselves verified in the denotational interpretation) which give maximizing or minimizing strategies directly. In the case of Game, we do have such a theorem [Morgan and McIver 1997; McIver and Morgan 2004] : Paraphrased, it states in this case that the investor should make an immediate reservation just when the expected value of the stock in one month's time is at least as great as the expected value of the whole game played from this point. (21) Otherwise, he should wait.
The expected value of the stock in one month's time is easily calculated: It is just m. v. (v, p, c) , where v, p, c are taken from the state "now" (note that the 0.50 1.00 2.00 3.00 4.00 5.00 6.00 7.00 8.00 9.00 9.50
Since the current values of v, p, c are known at the beginning of each month (at the beginning of each turn, more generally), this maximizing strategy can be applied in practice, provided that the fixed point can be approximated sufficiently well. For our current game, comparing (20) and (22) confirms our previous guess about the problem with Strategy (3): instead of its recommendation, our initial move should be "make an immediate reservation if v ≥ 6, otherwise wait." In general, if we follow (21) consistently, we will realize at least the optimum (20) over sufficiently many trials.
Other Games
Variations on Eq. (2) can describe the value of other, related games.
It might be, for example, that a client's instructions are "get me the shares when they're worth at least $6," and the investor's aim is to maximize his chance of doing so. Let atLeast6 denote the characteristic function of those states where v ≥ 6; then
gives a lower bound for I 's probability of achieving v ≥ 6 with an optimal strategy. By analogy with Eq. (21)-the same theorem applies-this strategy should be make an immediate reservation just when the probability of achieving v ≥ 6 next month is at least as great as the optimal.
Next we tabulate the probabilities, giving for contrast the results of the strategy "reserve when v ≥ 5 and p ≥ 0.5," that is, the intuitive approach of waiting until the chance of achieving v ≥ 6 next month is at least even: We can see from the table that when v is $5 initially, the intuitive strategy is optimal: "reserve now." At $6, however, the optimal strategy (counterintuitively) is to wait. For the current example, our results justified our using the denotational interpretation to analyze Game, which in this simple case, led to a direct calculation (20) of the optimal result, and the formulation of an explicit strategy (21) to achieve it.
For example, PRISM [Kwiatkowska et al. 2002 ] is a probabilistic model checker which has support for MDPs.
11 It takes as input an occam-like [occam 2006 ] description of a transition system, including both overlapping guard-style (traditional, in CSP [Roscoe 1998 ] parlance, "internal") nondeterminism and (beyond occam/CSP) probabilistic choice constructs. Using BDD-based techniques, it translates the input description into an MDP, called f , say. Normally, the tool allows the verification of MDPs against specifications written in the temporal logic pCTL [Hansson and Jonsson 1994a] ; in this case, an extended version was used that supports reward-based specifications. The rewards are evaluated by approximating the least fixed-point of f or f by repeated applications beginning from the bottom (zero), where f or f interprets (all) nonprobabilistic nondeterminism as minimizing or maximizing, respectively, That is, "unimodally" and the interpretation of the result as a measure of the minimum or maximum possible reward in a probabilistic/demonic or probabilistic/angelic game is justified by Theorem 6.10.
To deal with the "bimodal," minimax nondeterminism of our example, the PRISM-produced transition matrices for the MDP were exported, and used as data for a MatLab r program that performed the angelic/demonic calculations explicitly; the results agreed with the calculations we had previously obtained from Mathematica r by coding up the qMμ formula (2) directly [Scripts 2006 ]. The justification in this more general case that the value can be interpreted as the minimax expected reward of the original game is provided by our Theorem 6.10.
CONCLUSION
The minimax theorem for zero-sum two-player games was proved by von Neumann and Morgenstern [1944] for one kind of play in a single game. Everett [1957] extended this to "least-fixed point" games, that is, an unbounded number of plays of a finite number of possibly different games that can recursively call each other within a single "loop." For the special case where these games are turn-based, we have extended that result further to include both least and greatest fixed points, and arbitrary nesting.
Our reason for doing this was to introduce a novel game-based interpretation for the quantitative μ-calculus qMμ over probabilistic/angelic/demonic transition systems, probabilistically generalizing Stirling's game interpretation of the standard μ-calculus; we aimed to show its equivalence to our existing Kozenstyle interpretation of qMμ, and so to provide an "operational" semantics.
The equivalent interpretations are general enough to specify cost-based properties of probabilistic systems-and many such properties lie outside standard temporal logic. The Stirling-style game interpretation is close to automatabased approaches, whilst the Kozen-style denotational interpretation (studied more extensively elsewhere [Morgan and McIver 1999a] ) provides an attractive proof system. An interesting possibility for further work is the use of intermediate fixedpoints, yielding, say, a value 0 < e < 1, rather than the fixed zero-for-least and one-for-greatest that are traditional. For expectation transformer t and scalar e, we would propose the definition (23) is meaningful (i.e., converges) for any 0 ≤ e ≤ 1, and agrees with μ, ν where it should.
12
We do not know, however, whether convergence is guaranteed when t may contain angelic or demonic nondeterminism.
The utility of fix e is when infinite behavior is to attract a reward which is neither zero nor one. In the game interpretation, we would collapse Cases 2 and 3 of Definition 4.2 to the single:
(2) The path π is infinite and there is a color C appearing infinitely often that was generated by fix e for some e; in this case Val.π is e.
In the denotational interpretation we would use the preceding Eq. (23).
For the investor of Section 5, it might be that his reservation costs some fixed $e, so that infinite behavior (never reserving) is awarded $e, rather than zero (i.e., he keeps his money). A more advanced use would be that he seeks to maximize his profit, defined to be the difference v 1 − v 0 , where v 0 is the market value v when he reserves, and v 1 is its value one month later (when the shares are delivered, and he can sell). Because v 1 − v 0 could be negative, we would shift-and-scale to transform the expectations into the range [0, 1], with the effect that the zero awarded for "never reserves" would be transformed to 0.5.
RELATED WORK
Probabilistic temporal logics, interpreted over nondeterministic/probabilistic transition systems, have been studied extensively, most notably by Courcoubetis and Yannakakis [ ], de Alfaro [1997 , Hansson and Jonsson [1994b] , and Segala [1995] and Vardi [1988] . Condon [1992] considered the complexity of underlying transition systems like ours, including probabilistic, demonic, and angelic choice, but without our more general expectations and payoffs. Monniaux [2000] uses Kozen's deterministic formulation together with demonic program inputs to analyze systems via abstract interpretation [Cousot and Cousot 1992] .
The logic pCTL of Aziz et al. [1995] and Hansson and Jonsson [1994a] provides a threshold operator which allows properties such as "φ is eventually satisfied with probability at least 0.75," where the underlying distribution is over execution paths. Similarly, Narasimha et al. [1999] use probability thresholds, and restrict to the alternation-free fragment of the μ-calculus; for this fragment they do provide an operational interpretation which selects the proportion of paths that satisfy the given formula. Their transition systems are deterministic.
Though the quantitative μ-calculus has received much less attention, its use of expected values allows a greater variety of expression-in particular, it can specify properties that are inherently cost-based.
12 Using a constant expectation e is necessary, as lim n→∞ t n .x does not converge in general if expectation x varies over the state. For example, let S= {0, 1} and take t to be (the transformer corresponding to) s: = 1−s for s ∈ S, with x.s= s; then t n .x.s = (s + n) mod 2. Huth and Kwiatkowska [1997] , for example, use real-valued expressions based on expectations, and they have investigated model-checking approaches to evaluating them; but they do not provide an operational interpretation of the logic, nor have they exploited its algebraic properties [Morgan and McIver 1999a] .
More recently, de Alfaro has given theorems for equivalence of game and denotational interpretations of quantitative μ-calculus formulae for "discounted" two-player games, provided the formulae are "strongly deterministic" [de Alfaro 2003] . Strongly deterministic is a syntactic criterion that restricts to formulae which avoid the difference we illustrated earlier: that is, their game value, as we define it, and their "proportion of paths LTL-satisfying" value (as previously) are in agreement.
13 Discounted (turn-based) games, in our terms, are a special case of our Everett-style payoff states in which the probability of transition to $ is the complement 1 − α of the discount factor α, as illustrated in Figure 1 .
More recently still, Chatterjee et al. [2004] and Zielonka [2004] have shown independently that perfect-information stochastic parity games have memoryless strategies, using combinatorial-type arguments entirely in the game interpretation (which is thus very different than our original proof [McIver and Morgan 2002] ). In the current framework, their result is a corollary of the equality (15) = (16) of Martin (that the game's value is well-defined), our Theorem 6.10 (that the game's value equals the denotational value), and our Lemma 6.8 (that there are memoryless strategies realizing the denotational value). We must prove that for all n, states s , and all extensions π of π + , we have
for suitable approximants Val C n of Val defined at Lemma 6.6, where C is the color chosen at position ((μX · ), s) during the tree building, that is when the fixed-point formula was encountered.
PROOF. We must now be precise about the way colors are allocated and later used for looking-up formulae; we use the explicit path argument to provide a neat formalization of this. Let the colors C be subscripted variable symbols of qMμ-that is, when creating a fresh color from a fixed point with bound variable X , use X i , where i is the length of the path π at the point the binding X is encountered. To look up color X i at some later point π extending π , we simply take the ith element of π (it will contain a fixed-point formula with binding variable X and body , say) and then we construct [X → X i ] for the formula retrieved. 13 The restriction also excludes, for example, the case study of Section 5, where our interest is genuinely in a game's minimax value, rather than in the probability of satisfying an LTL specification. The special case treated in Section 7.2 can, however, be expressed in pCTL.
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Rather than writing C for the color (as we did in the main proof), we will now write X i .
We proceed by induction over n; in Case 0, both sides are zero.
In Case n+1, we reason that for all s and extensions π of π + , we have
Val inductive appeal to (8)-for all extensions π of π , and states s , define
n+1 , see ( ‡) to follow thus establishing the inductive case. † For the deferred justification, we note that because contains no X i , and
.π .s made from them will contain no X i 's either.
Thus replacing Val by Val
X i n+1 will make no difference. Therefore the X i 's can come from only three places: (1) from itself (but contains no X i , since X i was fresh); (2) from the interior of formulae retrieved from π by looking up other colors in (but π contains no "embedded" X i either, again because it was fresh); or (3) from the subsequent creation of colors (but they themselves will be fresh, different from X i , by construction-guaranteed by the fact that the length of π exceeds the length of π and that the length determines the subscript of any newly-created color). This is the import of "choose a fresh color" in the tree-building algorithm. ‡ For the final step, we are appealing to the fact that the function g was defined precisely so that at all the points in the constructed tree where X occurs (lefthand side) or "used to be" (righthand side, now replaced by X i ), it makes no difference to the integral Val X i n+1 whether we
(1) look-up variable X in V [X → g ] to get g , which when applied to the path π and state s at this point gives a tip ( g .π .s ) directly; or (2) look up color X i in path π to recover the formula [X →X i ] and carry on building the tree next.
That is, the value in the tip constructed at (1) is exactly the value realized from the tree constructed at (2) by the integral Val X i n+1 . In more detail: We are in fact relying on an elementary property of F over game trees for general F . Take any game tree T , and describe its subtrees as pairs π, U , where U is (also) a game tree and π is the path leading from the root of T to just before the root of U . Let T [ π, U → V ] be the tree resulting from replacing this entire subtree by another tree V . We then have that
where
for all π , and we are writing + + for path concatenation. In effect, on the right we subtract the contribution made by U and then add back the contribution made by V , but in each case we use F π over the subtree to compensate for the fact that its contribution is made within (i.e., at π ) the overall tree T . Furthermore, the preceding holds for any countable pairwisedisjoint set of such substitutions done simultaneously. Now, for the final step in the aforementioned chain of equalities, we reason backwards from its last line (call it [−1]) to the second-to-last ([−2]) using an instantiation of Eq. (24). We unify [−1] and the first term on the righthand-side of (24) by choosing function F to be Val X i n+1 , and the tree T to be [[ [X →X i ] 
V .π .s . Now, Tree T contains (at most) a countable number, k-indexed say, of "first encounter of X i from the root of T " positions (X i , s k ), and each is the final element of some path π k containing no other X i ; below each π k is some subtree U k , which from our tree construction procedure, we know will be
since [X →X i ] is what is returned when we look up color X i and π + + π k is the overall path that leads to this point (refer Case (8) of Figure 5 ). One-by-one, we will use these U k 's as U in countably-many applications of (24). For each k the function F π in (24), which we will call F π k , will be (Val n because π k contains exactly one X i (at its end) which "uses up" the +1 in the subscript n+1. Thus, for each k, the second term on the right of (24) over Tree (25), namely,
Now for the the third term, we choose the V k (to replace U k ) to be the trivial subtree comprising just a tip (x k ); this makes
With the second and third terms in (24) equal, the first term on its own (which we recall is [−1]) equals the lefthand side. Figures 7 and 8 illustrate the trees occurring in the left and righthand sides of (24).
We will now show that the lefthand-side of (24) is equal to [−2]. The tree used there (Figure 7) is
that is, the result of all the k-indexed substutitions done simultaneously, and each V k is just the tip (
.π .s used in [−2] is the same, except that it contains the tip ( g .π k .s k ) at these places (the places agree because they are both determined by the occurrences of X in the original formula ).
Comparison of the definition of g (at [−2])-noting that its arguments at each k will be π = π + + π k and s = s k -and the definition of x k (at Eq. (26)) shows these tip values to be equal. This concludes our justification of the final step, and of our inductive proof of Eq. (8) as a whole. Here we prove the result used for the elimination of from least fixed-points in Section 6.6. We resume the mathematical style of presentation used there, where variables f , g , . . . denote (Curried) functions of type expectation(s)-toexpectation, and w, x, . . . are expectations in E S. For function f of one argument, we write μ. f for its least fixed-point.
We must show that for function f , defined as in that case, and any ε > 0, there is a G ε such that μ.
The proof is via a number of lemmas, with our result appearing as Lemma B.11. Definition B.1 (Almost Linear). Say that an expectation-valued function f of possibly several expectation arguments x, y, . . . , z is almost-linear if it can be written in the form
where w is an expectation and g , h, . . . , i are linear non-negative expectationvalued functions of their single arguments. can be written in the form given on the right in Eq. (27), provided φ contains neither nor . This is a straightforward structural induction over φ. Note first that the form (27) is preserved under function application: In other words, if f .x. y and f .z.w are both in the form (27), then so too are f .x.( f .z.w) and f .( f .z.w). y. The result now follows immediately, since the meanings of compound formulae are all given by such function applications, or (in the case of fixed points) by well-defined limits of them, and the linearity is easily shown to be preserved in the limit. f .x, we have that
The ok property is significant because, as we shall see, combined with Lemma B.9 to follow, it allows us to find "almost-optimal" strategies such as the G ε we need.
We now prove in several stages that if f is almost-linear, then f is ok in each argument separately (in Lemma B.8). From now on, we will fix the non-x arguments of f , and omit them for brevity. LEMMA B.6 (STATIONARY ZEROES). Let transformer f be almost-linear, and define its kernel K to be those states on which its fixed point is zero, that is, subset K of S is {s: S | μ. f .s = 0}. so showing that (ε + 1)(μ. f ) − εx is a preleast fixed-point of f . Thus, by the least fixed-point property, 17 we have μ. f ≤ (ε + 1)(μ. f ) − εx , whence since ε > 0, we conclude that x ≤ μ. f , as required. Thus we have proved that all almost-linear transformers are ok in their arguments separately.
We now put these results together to give an essential property of / -free formulae.
LEMMA B.9. All / -free formulae φ denote ok functions of their free expectations X , Y, . . . , Z taken separately.
PROOF. Lemmas B.2 and B.8.
The following lemma now brings us close to our overall result in that it shows that least fixed points can be approximated from below via "almost optimal" strategies. Note that this does not depend on f 's being ok; that property is used only afterwards for the final step, where we combine Lemma B.9 and Lemma B.10 to prove Lemma B.11, which gives us the f G ε we needed in Section 6.6. 
where ε is the everywhere-ε expectation. That is, we can find an almost-increasedby-f expectation x that approaches μ. f as closely as we please from below.
PROOF. Define a subset T of the state space S by
so that the subset T is "the termination set for f," comprising those states at which f reaches its fixed point in just one step. Because S is finite, we can proceed by induction decreasing over these sets T determined by f , with the base case therefore being when T is all of S. We strengthen Condition (29) of the inductive hypothesis to read
Case T = S. Define x= (μ. f − ε) 0 so that Eq. (29a) is satisfied trivially. Since ε > 0, we have also that x μ. f , and then from T = S and monotonicity of f , we reason that
Now from this and v < v * , we have immediately 27 that v < μ.F also, and since F is monotonic (it is constructed from monotonic pieces), by the least fixed-point property, we have F.v ≤ v-which contradicts (38). Therefore, our assumption must fail: There must be some 0 < ε * 2 ≤ ε 2 for which not all choices of x ε * 2 v satisfying (33) satisfy (37) as well-that is, at least one will satisfy (34) at s * . This is the value we take.
C. CONTINUITY
We use continuity in two places: In the argument of Section 6.4 that shows the game and denotational interpretations to be equivalent when the strategies are fixed, we appeal to -continuity in the proof of Lemma 6.2 (Footnote 7); and in the use of Lemma B.10 within the proof of Lemma B.11-itself the key component of Lemma 6.8 that memoryless strategies suffice-we appeal to analytic continuity (Footnote 23).
Beyond proof, the -(and dually, ) continuity of the denotations, so proved, is what justifies the use of iteration to approximate their values (Footnote 9).
C.1 The -continuity of |||φ|||
This is shown once and for all by an argument similar to the proof of Lemma B.2, that is, by induction over φ, which, because of the explicit strategies σ , σ , behaves as if it is / -free. A complication, however, is that the effective state space for the argument is not finite, as in Lemma B.2, because in Section 6.4 we have an extra path argument π which may take infinitely many values. This is why we do not appeal directly to Lemma B.2 with an argument that -continuity would follow from analytic continuity and monotonicity. The proof is otherwise similar, however, maintaining inductively that all the linear functions g , h, . . . , i distribute infinite sums of non-negative terms.
It is because we do not appeal to Lemma B.2 directly that the proof of Lemma 6.6 goes through for infinite state spaces (we do not use that fact, however).
C.2 The Analytic Continuity of Almost-Linear Finitary Functions
This is straightforward from the fact that since the linear functions g , h, . . . , i are over finite vectors of reals, they are simply matrices, with function application being matrix multiplication.
